Generally, custody issues are litigated in a divorce suit, a stand-alone custody suit, or a domestic violence protective order suit.1  The initial evaluation of a custody case should answer the following questions:

Which state and/or courts have jurisdiction and venue? Do not make the client wait for an appointment if Louisiana courts in your service area lack jurisdiction or venue. Determine jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA) and venue under the Code of Civil Procedure in the initial screening.2  Refer the client to the proper jurisdiction if necessary.

What is the client’s relationship to the child(ren)? Is the client a filiated parent, an unaffiliated biological parent, or a non-parent? Who are the legal, filiated parents of the child(ren)?

Which custody standard governs? The standard for obtaining custody varies depending on the parties and their litigation history.3

Parent v. Parent: Custody disputes between parents are decided under the “best interest of the children” standard. Joint custody must be awarded to the parents unless there a “history of family violence” or clear and convincing evidence that the children’s best interest requires an award of sole custody.4  In family violence cases, there is a statutory presumption that no parent who has a “history of perpetrating family violence” shall be awarded joint or sole custody.5

Parent v. Non-Parent: There is a threshold analysis the court must make when a non-parent is seeking custody. The non-parent must show that parental custody will cause substantial harm to the child. The non-parent’s burden of proof is clear and convincing evidence. Once this burden has been met, then the court will make a best interest of the child analysis.6

Modifications: Modifications of custody decrees (whether considered or consent) require a burden of proof that at a minimum, will require a material change of circumstances since the prior custody decree before the best interest of the child considerations are applied, also known as the Evans standard.7  If the prior custody judgment was a considered decree, the more arduous Bergeron standard will apply.8

Can the client meet the applicable custody standard? To evaluate a client’s legal problem, get as much information as possible from the client. Engage the client in conversation. Find out what is going on with the family. Often, one will discover information helpful to a client just by talking with the client. A person seeking a divorce may not volunteer that there has been family violence. Pry a bit. Ask questions, even ones outside the parameters of the particular problem for which you are consulted. Experienced attorneys will listen to what is said and what is not said.

Is there a “history of family violence?” If there is a history of family violence, the victim may have a strong case for sole custody and supervised visitation.9

Is the case meritorious? With experience, an attorney will acquire one of the most important skills in family law practice – what is known as “sixth sense”. Being able to evaluate an applicant’s account of their case, requires knowledge of the law and the ability to zero in on what could make or break the case. All this needs to be done in an expedient but competent manner that still assures that each client gets the consideration she deserves.

Ask the client about witnesses who can support the client’s version of the case facts. Get their names, addresses and phone numbers. Not only does this provide useful information for future proceedings, speaking to witnesses allows you to verify your client’s version of the facts. Find out what the client thinks the other party and that party’s witnesses will say about the client. Most experienced attorneys know that the “truth” usually lies somewhere in the middle. It is better to know the facts at the front end than to be surprised in court. Likewise, information about the client may be gleaned from the family’s contact with other organizations, e.g., Community Health Clinic, Child Protection, Support Enforcement Services, etc. Verify your client’s story with the child’s teachers and counselors. It is better to spend more time during intake or before you accept the client for services than to waste resources on a client whose case has little or no merit.

• 1A more comprehensive treatment of the unique laws and considerations applicable to custody disputes in the context of domestic violence, see Section 8 of this manual’s chapter on representing survivors of domestic violence.
• 2126 On venue, see La. C.C.P. art. 74.2. On UCCJEA jurisdiction, see Section 4.10.
• 3On these standards, see Section 4.2 and Section 4.4.
• 4La. C.C. art. 132.
• 5La. R.S. 9:364. For further discussion, see Section 8.3.2 of this manual’s chapter on representing survivors of domestic violence.
• 6La. C.C. art. 133.
• 7Evans v. Lungrin, 97-0541 (La. 2/6/98), 708 So. 2d 731. For further discussion of the standards for modification of custody orders, see Section 4.4.3 and Section 4.4.4.
• 8Bergeron v. Bergeron, 492 So. 2d 1193 (La. 1986).
• 9See La. R.S. 9:364. For further discussion, see Section 8 of this manual’s chapter on representing survivors of domestic violence.

An attorney should never try a custody case without first pursuing settlement.1  Spend time with your client to ensure that the client understands that whatever result is truly in the children’s best interests will ultimately also end up being in the parents’ best interest. The client also faces the risk of having a stranger, the judge, decide what is in the children’s best interest, and the result may be contrary to the children’s best interest.

Encourage your clients to be reasonable. Turn down, not up, the heat between the parties. You will not only become a better “family” lawyer, but a better human being. If appropriate, recommend mediation as an alternative method of settling disputes.2  Let your “word be your bond.”

In evaluating your client’s case, do not make the mistake of only believing your client’s version of the facts. There are always two sides to every story. Respect the objectives and concerns of both parties. The practice of family law is not so much about winning or losing. Rather, it is doing as little damage as possible to children who are in a difficult, often traumatic, situation not of their making.

• 1Cases involving domestic violence may require a different approach to settlement or foregoing settlement entirely. For a discussion of settlement in the context of domestic violence, see Section 4.11.3 of this manual’s chapter on representing survivors of domestic violence.
• 2Mediation should not be used in domestic violence cases. See La. R.S. 9:363.

It is critical to identify whether there is a “history of family violence” against your client.1  If there is, your client will have a strong case for sole custody. The 2018 revisions to La. C.C. art. 134 have made the potential for a child to be abused the primary consideration in determining the child’s best interest. If there is a history of family violence, La. R.S 9:364 will govern the custody determination. La. R.S. 9:364 creates a very high bar for the abuser to get any custodial rights other than visitation. After proving completion of a treatment program and freedom from substance abuse, the abuser must still prove that the child’s best interest requires his participation as a custodial parent because the other parent has abandoned the child, suffers from mental illness, substance abuse, or “other circumstances” that affect the child’s best interest. The phrase, “other circumstances” refers to the preceding statutory terms in R.S. 9:364(B)(3), which all involve circumstances on the magnitude of parental unfitness. Thus, under the rule of ejusdem generis, “other circumstances” must be things like the preceding terms, which amount to parental unfitness. The term, “other circumstances” must be more than the best interest standard.

Many family violence victims are traumatized and intimidated. At an initial interview, they may tell you that they only want joint custody. As attorneys, we must respect the client’s objective. However, many victims will later change their minds and want sole custody. When they change their mind, it may be too late to amend the petition and it will require more filing fees and delay in the litigation. They may not remember that you told them about their right to sole custody. It is important to discuss with the client the advantages of sole custody. If they decide they only want joint custody, you should have them sign a statement acknowledging that you advised them of their right to sole custody and the various benefits of sole custody. It is well known that many abusers use custody litigation to continue their harassment of their victim.

• 1If you identify a history of family violence, it is a good practice to involve an attorney with experience working with survivors of domestic abuse and familiar with the unique laws in this area, which differ from those applicable in other circumstances. Section 1 and Section 2 of this manual’s chapter on representing survivors of domestic violence provides extensive discussion of these issues.

In many jurisdictions, teachers, principals, or school counselors are persuasive witnesses. Our courts are invariably persuaded by disinterested third parties. Certainly, if a child is doing well in school and his teacher can testify that your client is involved in the child’s school activities and work, your client has a very good chance of being successful in court. Ask your client about his child’s school performance and school activities. Gather the names, phone numbers and addresses of potential witnesses. Note the specific areas of their anticipated testimony and how it relates to the Article 134 factors. Also, obtain documentary evidence that supports your client’s case.

Under La. C.E. art. 1101, the rules of evidence can be relaxed in child custody matters. Nonetheless, the judge may only allow proper evidence in order to assure fairness. Do not withhold testimony or documents you would like the court to hear or view just because they might be inadmissible under the normal rules of evidence. Submit to the court that the evidence is relevant, probative, and admissible. Sharing such “improper” evidence in pre-trial scheduling orders1  or discovery and giving an opportunity for the other side to refute it bolsters your argument to the court for the admission of evidence under Article 1101.

Social media, particularly Facebook, have become a fertile source of evidence for custody litigation. Warn your client against the use of social media during custody litigation. Postings on Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, and other social media may be discovered by the opposing party and used as evidence.

It is always best to ensure that your main witness testimony and documentary evidence are admissible and constitute proper evidence rather than relying on the chance that either the opposing party or the judge is inattentive. The court has the authority and the “gate keeping” duty to ensure that the decision is based on proper evidence.2  Medical reports need to be certified.3  Police reports are not admissible unless a proper foundation exists.4

Opinion testimony by lay witnesses is governed by La. C.E. art. 701. Lay witnesses may express an opinion only if the court concludes that the opinion is “rationally based on the perception of the witness.” If an expert is court appointed, calling the expert as a witness at trial or deposing the expert are options.5  Be careful in not stipulating to the report and waiving the right to cross examine the expert. If so, you will be stuck with the expert’s custody/mental health evaluation report, which is usually relied on by the court. In some custody cases, parties may hire their own expert witnesses. Review each aspect of the expert’s anticipated testimony with him. Suggest areas of inquiry that opposing counsel may pursue in cross-examination. Be sure that you are both on the same page. The test for qualifying an expert is whether the expert has specialized knowledge that can assist the court in understanding the evidence or in determining a fact in issue.6  Anticipate Daubert challenges to witnesses. A good resource for preparing your custody case with expert witnesses is Chapter 11 of Linda D. Elrod’s Child Custody Practice and Procedure. Other valuable resources for trial preparation include West’s Louisiana Code of Evidence Handbook, Lowe’s Louisiana Divorce, §§ 3.34-90, and Triche’s Handbook on Louisiana Family Law, Title 5, Evidence Commentary.

• 1La. C.C.P. art. 1551.
• 2See La. C.E. art. 403.
• 3La. R.S. 13:3714.
• 4See La. C.E. art. 803(8)(b).
• 5See La. C.E. 706.
• 6La. C.E. art. 702.

A custody determination may be sought by an original action for custody or by a Rule for Custody within a divorce or paternity lawsuit. An original action for custody only may be started by filing a petition for custody, i.e., a “Petition for Custody: Ordinary Proceeding.” The pleadings caption should be used to “flag” the Court’s attention to treat it as an ordinary proceeding. If there is already a pending ordinary action such as divorce, paternity suit, etc., a Rule for Custody may be filed as a summary proceeding within the ordinary proceeding.

When a custody action is instituted by a Petition for Custody, formal service and citation of the petition on the defendant is required (unless the defendant signs a waiver). Thereafter, the defendant is required to answer the petition within 21 days. If the defendant does not answer, the plaintiff may move for a default judgment. Obtaining the default judgment will require proof of prima facie case. If, instead, a custody rule is filed, the court will set a date for hearing of the rule, and the plaintiff must appear and prove the claim for custody at the hearing. The default procedures (reserved for ordinary proceedings) may not be used to obtain a custody judgment that is sought by a custody rule (summary proceeding). Some courts will require by local rule that ancillary matters be first set for a Hearing Officer Conference. It is best to contact the Hearing Officer’s office in the event there is a need to bypass the Conference or to make this request at the time of filing.

Louisiana has “fact pleadings.” Thus, you must specifically plead those facts necessary to obtain the relief requested. Also, in family law matters, you generally cannot get what you do not pray for. If you are seeking sole custody for your client, you must plead specific facts, which, if proven, would entitle your client to sole custody. You should pray for sole custody if the client has a case for sole custody and wants to pursue sole custody. Do not simply state that it is in the best interests of the children that your client be awarded sole custody. Rather, state the facts which clearly establish that an award of sole custody to your client is in the children’s best interest. If you seek a modification of custody, you must plead the grounds for modification. Failure to plead a change of circumstances subjects the custody pleading to a no cause of action exception.

An initial custody pleading should allege facts which establish custody jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJEA)1  and must attach an affidavit that provides the information required by La. R.S. 13:1821(A).2

• 1La. R.S. 13:1801, et seq. For further discussion of the UCCJEA, see Section 4.10.
• 2Note that this requirement may pose problems for domestic violence victims who should not have to disclose their specific address. Consider options for protecting the confidentiality of the victim’s address if necessary.

The burden of proof will vary in a child custody case depending on the history of the case, the parties to the case, and the kind of custody (sole or joint) being sought. First, you should identify the burden of proof applicable to your custody case.

If a custody dispute between parents has never been heard by a court, the burden of proof will only be the “best interest of child.” Best interest for domiciliary parent status is determined by the preponderance of the evidence. Best interest for sole custody is governed by the clear and convincing evidence standard.1  If the case is an initial dispute between parents and non-parents, the burden of proof is substantial harm to the child by clear and convincing evidence.2

• 1La. C.C. art. 132.
• 2La. C.C. art. 133.

In Louisiana, the burden of proof for modifying custody depends on whether the original judgment was a consent judgment or whether it was a considered decree of the court. The leading cases are Evans v. Lungrin1  for consent judgments and Bergeron v. Bergeron2  for considered decrees.

A judgment reached by consent is a “stipulated judgment.” Modification of a consent judgment only requires proof of a material change in circumstances and that the proposed modification is in the child’s best interest (i.e., the Evans standard).3  In some circuits, the parties may stipulate in a consent judgment to the application of the higher Bergeron burden of proof for custody modification (i.e., the burden applicable to considered decrees).4  The circuits are also split as to whether the parties may stipulate in a consent judgment to a standard lower than the material change of circumstances recognized in Evans. Note that a provision in a consent judgment stating that the custody arrangement may be reviewed in the future does not necessarily make the judgment an interlocutory or interim custody judgment.

Sometimes, a consent judgment may be a “considered decree,” which triggers the Bergeron standard. In Cherry v. Cherry, the court found that a consent judgment entered after 3 days of trial testimony was a “considered” decree that required the Bergeron burden of proof for modification.2004-CA-0002 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2/2/05), 894 So. 2d 1208. However, in Poole v. Poole, another court found that a consent judgment entered after the second day of trial was a stipulated judgment and not “considered decree” and, thus, governed by the Evans “material change in circumstances” test rather than the Bergeron test.5

• 197-0541 (La. 2/6/98), 708 So. 2d 731.
• 2492 So. 2d 1193 (La. 1986).
• 3See Evans, 97-0541, 708 So. 2d 731.
• 4On this higher burden, see Section 4.4.4.
• 541,220 (La. App. 2 Cir. 3/22/06), 926 So. 2d 60.

If a court receives evidence of parental fitness, any resulting judgment of custody between parents will be a “considered decree,” and subsequent modifications will require a heavy burden of proof under the Bergeron standard. In Bergeron v. Bergeron,1  the Supreme Court, applying the doctrine of jurisprudence constante, articulated the burden of proof necessary to modify a considered decree of “permanent” custody as follows:

When a trial court has made a considered decree of permanent2  custody, the party seeking a change bears a heavy burden of proving that the continuation of the present custody is so deleterious to the child as to justify modification of the custody decree, or of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the harm likely to be caused by a change in environment is substantially outweighed by its advantages to the child.

While the heavy burden of proof is synonymous with Bergeron, the affirmation by the court of two other rules is often overlooked. These rules are the change-of-circumstances rule and the rule for appellate review (i.e., the determination of the trial judge in child custody matters is entitled to great weight, and the trial court’s discretion will not be disturbed on review in the absence of a clear showing of abuse).3  It is from the change-of-circumstance rule that the rule for the burden of proof for a consent judgment evolved among the circuit courts and as articulated in Hensgens v. Hensgens4  and recognized later by our supreme court in Evans v. Lungrin.5  The need for the set of rules was summed up by the Bergeron court as follows:

[M]ore harm is done to children by custody litigation, custody changes, and interparental conflict, than by such factors as the custodial parent’s post divorce amours, remarriage, and residential changes, which more often precipitate custody battles under liberal custody modification rules than conduct that is obviously harmful to the child, such as abuse or serious neglect, which justifies intervention to protect the child . . . .6        

The Bergeron heavy burden of proof is difficult to overcome. As recently noted by the Supreme Court, modification of considered decrees is awarded sparingly and is reserved for the most egregious offenses such as sexual molestation and physical abuse.7

The courts have applied Bergeron to a parent’s motion to modify a considered decree of permanent custody to a non-parent. Bergeron does not apply to a temporary custody award to a parent or non-parent. An interim or temporary custody judgment is subject to change until the issuance of the final permanent custody judgment.8

• 1492 So. 2d 1193 (La. 1986).
• 2The Supreme Court used the term “permanent” in Bergeron. Technically, however, there are no “permanent” custody decrees because they are always subject to modification.
• 3Bergeron, 492 So. 2d at 1203.
• 494-1200 (La. App. 3 Cir. 3/15/05), 653 So. 2d 48.
• 597-0541 (La. 2/6/98), 708 So. 2d 731.
• 6492 So. 2d at 1199.
• 7For other examples of what constitutes a change in circumstances, see Silbernagel v. Sibernagel, 10-CA-267 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/10/11), 65 So. 3d 724, 728 (long drive between parents’ homes no longer manageable); Lemoine v. Lemoine, 09-861 (La. App. 3 Cir. 12/16/09), 27 So. 3d 1062 (exacerbation of allergies by smoking and dogs was a change of circumstance); Beene v. Beene, 43,845 (La. App. 2 Cir. 10/22/08), 997 So. 2d 169 (impact on child’s emotional welfare from domestic violence against mother by her subsequent ex-husband). But see Kyle v. Leeth, 98 CA 0756 (La. App. 1 Cir. 11/6/98), 727 So. 2d 497 (absence of single mother from child’s home 75% of time was not a change of circumstance).
• 8Riels v. Riels, 2004-0567, p. 4 (La. App. 4 Cir. 5/25/05), 905 So. 2d 361, 364.

The Louisiana Supreme Court has held that the Evans and Bergeron standards apply equally to non-parent custody cases under La. C.C. art. 133.1  Only if the judgment awarding custody to a non-parent is a considered decree will the heightened standard of Bergeron apply.

• 1Tracie F. v. Francisco D., 2015-1812 (La. 3/15/16), 188 So. 3d 231.

The burden of proof for a non-parent to obtain custody is much higher than the best interest standard that governs parental custody disputes. A parent has a paramount right to custody that can only be forfeited for compelling reasons.1  A non-parent must establish that the award of custody to “either parent would result in substantial harm to the child.”2  The short-term distress of returning a child to a parent does not constitute the severe detriment required for a custody award to non-parents.3  Furthermore, a parent’s custodial rights should not be defeated by a non-parent’s litigation delays to withhold a child.4  A parent’s poverty is not a reason to deny custody.5

If custody to the parents is denied, third parties with whom the child has lived in a wholesome and stable environment are preferred. However, if such a placement is not available, custody of the child may be awarded to a non-parent who meets both this higher burden of proof and can provide a stable and adequate environment for the child. Joint custody is not required. However, the court has discretion to order joint custody between a parent and non-parent.

If the mother of a child not filiated to his father dies, under La. C.C. 256, a court “shall give first consideration to appointment as tutor either of her parents or siblings who survive her, and secondly, the father, always taking into consideration the best interests of the child.” Per La. C.C.P. art. 4261, the tutor shall have custody of the minor.6  Thus, these articles combine to give a preference to the child’s maternal grandparents, uncles, and aunts in the unique situation where an unfiliated child’s mother dies before the child’s father acknowledges paternity.

• 1Wood v. Beard, 290 So. 2d 675 (La. 1974).
• 2La. C.C. art. 133.
• 3Lewis v. Taylor, 554 So. 2d 163 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1989).
• 4State v. Weber, 161 So. 2d 759, 766 (La. 1964).
• 5Creed v. Creed, 647 So. 2d 1362 (La. App. 3 Cir. 1994).
• 6See also In re Bogues, 236 So. 2d 665 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1970).

Cases discussing parent vs. non-parent custody disputes include:

Gill v. Bennett.1  Grandmother was not entitled to custody of child born out of wedlock, even though she had acted as child’s primary caretaker for a period of time and had been afforded status as child’s permanent guardian in an Indiana court prior to the child’s relocation to Louisiana, absent a showing that an award of custody to mother and father would have resulted in substantial harm to the child.

Rupert v. Swinford.2  Record supported finding that award of sole custody of child to father would cause substantial harm to child, and thus, trial court’s award of joint custody of father and maternal grandmother was not abuse of discretion, where there was testimony of father’s drug use, child had very close relationship with maternal grandmother with whom he had lived off and on for his entire life, and there was testimony that child had no regular meal times and kept late hours when staying with father.3

In re Melancon.4  The nonparent failed to allege a cause of action under La. C.C. art. 133 that allowed for an award of custody to a person other than a parent. Parent could not consent to joint custody with a non-parent. “In essence, the law today simply does not permit a parent to share custody with a non-parent without a showing of substantial harm to the child.”5

• 12011-886 (La. App. 3 Cir. 12/7/11), 82 So. 3d 383.
• 295-0395 (La. App. 1 Cir. 10/6/95), 671 So. 2d 502.
• 3See also McKinley v. McKinley, 631 So. 2d 45 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1994); In re Landrum, 97-826 (La. App. 3 Cir. 12/10/97), 704 So. 2d 872; Dalferes v. Dalferes, 98 1234 (La. App. 4 Cir. 11/18/98), 724 So. 2d 805.
• 42010-1463 (La. App. 1 Cir. 12/22/10), 62 So. 3d 759.
• 5Id. at 764.

KCSP provides cash assistance of $450 per month for each eligible child who resides with a qualified relative other than a parent. The child must live in the home of one of the following qualified relatives (either biological or adoptive): grandfather or grandmother (extends to great-great-great), brother or sister (including half), uncle or aunt (extends to great-great), stepfather, stepmother, stepbrother, stepsister, first cousin, including first cousin once removed, and nephew or niece (extends to great-great), or the legal spouse of the above-listed relatives. The qualified relative must possess or obtain within 1 year of certification, either legal custody or guardianship or provisional custody by mandate of the eligible child who is living in the home. The State reserves the right to pursue child support against the parent(s), and this may be of some concern to a grandparent. The kinship program can substantially improve the economic welfare of the family. The availability of kinship payments put an even higher priority on legal custody for non-parent caretakers of neglected children.1

• 1See Kinship Care Subsidy Program (KCSP), La. Dep’t of Child. & Fam. Servs.

Parents may grant a provisional custody by mandate to another person to take care of their children.1  These mandates (notarial acts) may be effective for up to one year. La. R.S. 9:975 authorizes non-legal custodians to give legal consent to medical or educational services by affidavit.

A provisional custody by mandate cannot be used to change a child’s school district absent a change in the child’s actual residence. If a parent or a caregiver does not have legal custody, school districts where the demand for enrollment is great will invariably reject the Custody by Mandate and deny school admission. In such cases, a Voluntary Transfer of Custody (VTOC) or a Petition for Custody may be necessary.

A VTOC, while a juvenile court proceeding, can be filed either in juvenile or district court; the courts have concurrent jurisdiction.2  If a VTOC is filed in juvenile court, any future modifications take place in that court unless the case is dismissed. Please note that the client is the parent or party who has legal custody - not the caregiver. The caregiver may be the client if the caregiver seeks to file a Petition for Custody against the parent. Obviously, the burden of proof would be much higher and parental unfitness must be shown (child faced with substantial harm, etc.) in a contradictory hearing.3  In the typical VTOC case, the parent and the caregiver are on “the same page”. Since the filing is voluntary, someone will have to pay the court costs for the VTOC; because the judgment is typically signed without a hearing, however, the costs are low.

Caveat: It is important to know who your client is. The parties may have a “fallout” down the road and want modifications. Also, if feasible, both parents (if no legal custody order is in place) need to consent to the transfer. Sometimes the mother, under investigation by Office of Community Services, will seek to transfer the child. It is wise (for your own peace of mind) to inquire into the suitability and fitness of the person who will receive the child.

There are unique statutes applicable to members of the military. Louisiana Military Powers of Attorney are governed by La. R.S. 9:3861, et seq. La. R.S. 9:3861–3862 provides a statutory form of power of attorney for military personnel to authorize another person to have custody. La. R.S. 9:3879.1 identifies the powers possessed by the authorized agent.

• 1La. R.S. 9:951.
• 2See La. Ch.C. art. 1510, et seq.
• 3For discussion of the requirements for an award of custody to a non-parent, see Section 4.7.

La. R.S. 9:355.1, et seq. govern relocation of a child’s principal residence. Relocation is defined as a change in the principal residence of a child for a period of sixty days or more, but does not include a temporary absence from the principal residence.1

In a custody case, you should always advise your client of the obligations under the relocation statute. Clients won’t know this law unless you tell them about it. The La. R.S. 9:355.2 relocation procedures apply if any of the following exist:

• There is an intent to move out of state, regardless of the distance.
• There is no custody order, and there is an intent to relocate the child’s principal residence to any Louisiana location that is more than 75 miles from the other parent’s domicile.
• There is a custody order, and there is an intent to relocate the child’s principal residence to any Louisiana location that is more than 75 miles from the child’s principal residence at the time of the custody order.
• The parties have an equal physical custody order or the child has no principal residence, and there is an intent to establish the child’s principal residence within the state that is more than 75 miles from the other party’s domicile.

Generally, in cases where the parties have equal physical custody (close to 50:50 and distinguished from shared custody2 ), a parent may not relocate the child’s residence without either the other parent’s express written consent or the court’s authorization after a contradictory hearing.3

• 1La. R.S. 9:355.1(2).
• 2See La. R.S. 9:355.1 cmt. (b) (providing that temporary absences of greater than 60 days, such as summer vacation, do not trigger the relocation statute).
• 3La. R.S. 9:355.3(B).

If the relocation statute applies,1  a parent must notify the other parent of the proposed relocation unless the parents have entered into an express written agreement for the relocation or a domestic violence protective order is in effect.2  Note that the duty to notify the other parent applies even if there is no custody order. La. R.S. 9:355.4 requires notice to non-parents who have court ordered visitation. However, non-parents with only visitation orders may not object to the proposed relocation and may only seek a modification of the visitation schedule.3

Notice of a proposed relocation must be given not later than 60 days before the proposed relocation or 10 days after the relocating parent has knowledge of the information required for the relocation notice if the parent requesting relocation did not have sufficient information to give 60 days’ notice. Notice is by certified mail or commercial courier.4

The court may consider a relocation without prior notice as a factor in determining relocation and sufficient cause for paying reasonable expenses incurred by the person who is objecting. Be sure to advise clients of their duties to comply with the notice and approval requirements of La. R.S. 9:355.5 should they decide to relocate.

• 1See Section 4.9.1.
• 2La. R.S. 9:355.2(D), .4.
• 3La. R.S. 9:355.8.
• 4La. R.S. 9:355.5.

Unless a person has equal physical custody of the child under a court decree, a person opposed to the relocation must object within 30 days of receipt of the relocation notice.1  If an objection is made, the parent proposing relocation must initiate a summary proceeding for court approval of the relocation within 30 days of the receipt of the objection.2  If an objection is filed, court approval may only be granted after a contradictory hearing.3

The relocating parent has the burden of proving that the relocation is made in good faith and is in the child’s best interest.4  The court must consider the statutory factors in its determination of the best child’s best interest in a relocation proceeding; these are similar to, but not identical to, the Article 134 best interest factors for an award of custody.5

• 1La. R.S. 9:355.7.
• 2La. R.S. 9:355.9.
• 3Id.
• 4La. R.S. 9:355.10.
• 5La. R.S. 9:355.14.

Gray v. Gray.1  The court concluded in allowing the relocation that there was no reason to retreat from the heightened Bergeron standard when a party seeks to modify a considered custody decree even in the context of a request for relocation.

Trahan v. Kingrey.2  The court denied relocation. Because the trial court failed to conduct any analysis of the mandatory factors, a de novo review by the court of appeal resulted in a change of domiciliary parent status as well.

Smith v. Holtzclaw.3  The court accepted the parties’ agreement as to relocation.

Perez v. Perez.4  The court allowed relocation. Although the trial court did not consider the relocation factors specifically, the findings were reasonable based upon the entire record. The dissent by Judge Keaty illustrates a detailed analysis of the relocation factors.

McLain v. McLain.5  The court denied relocation as neither the good faith nor the best interests tests were met. This is a good case that discusses some legitimate reasons for good faith relocation.

Quainoo v. Morelon-Quainoo.6  The court allowed relocation. Underemployment of objecting parent as well as good faith and best interest of relocating parent required reversal of trial court.

Gathen v. Gathen.7  This case discussed the evidentiary standards and concluded that the failure of the trial court to expressly analyze each factor in La. R.S. 9:355.14 was not legal error. But how do we know whether the trial court has considered all the enumerated factors? To ensure that the trial court has considered these 12 factors, it is always best to ask the judge for written reasons for judgments in all messy, complicated cases. La. R.S. 9:355.14 requires the court to consider the 12 enumerated factors with factor #12 being a catchall: “Any other factors affecting the best interest of the child.

• 12011-CJ-548 (La. 7/1/11), 65 So. 3d 1247.
• 22011-1900 (La. App. 1 Cir. 5/4/12), 98 So. 3d 347.
• 346,278 (La. App. 2 Cir. 4/13/11), 62 So. 3d 345.
• 42011-537 (La. App. 3 Cir. 2/29/12), 85 So. 3d 273.
• 52007-0752 (La. App. 4 Cir. 12/12/07), 974 So. 2d 726.
• 611-766 (La. App. 5 Cir. 4/10/12), 87 So. 3d 364.
• 72010-2312 (La. 5/10/11), 66 So. 3d 1.

The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA) applies to interstate and international custody disputes.1  The purpose of the UCCJEA is to avoid conflict and require cooperation and exchange of information among states regarding child custody matters. A court must have subject matter jurisdiction under the UCCJEA to make an initial child custody determination. The UCCJEA has been adopted by all fifty states. The UCCJEA also governs a court’s continuing jurisdiction over the custody dispute and jurisdiction to modify custody judgments.

The UCCJEA applies to all “child custody proceedings” in which legal custody, physical custody, or visitation with respect to a child is at issue. A “child custody proceeding includes a proceeding for divorce, separation, neglect, abuse, dependency, guardianship, paternity, termination of parental rights and protection from family violence, in which the custody or visitation issue may appear.”2  A “child custody proceeding” does not include adoption, authorization for medical care, juvenile delinquency, contractual emancipation, or Hague Convention enforcement actions.3

A child custody proceeding that pertains to an Indian child, as defined in the Indian Child Welfare Act, is not subject to the UCCJEA to the extent that it is governed by the Indian Child Welfare Act.4  The federal Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act governs full faith and credit for custody determinations and will preempt the UCCJEA where variances exist.5

• 1La. R.S. 13:1801, et seq.
• 2La. R.S. 13:1802(4).
• 3Id.
• 4La. R.S. 13:1804.
• 528 U.S.C. § 1738A.

Both the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA)1  and the federal Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA)2  are legislative responses to jurisdictional problems posed by interstate child custody disputes. Both acts govern interstate child custody disputes. A custody judgment is only enforceable if the issuing court has jurisdiction under state law and the UCCJEA and complied with the PKPA.3  Conceptually, the UCCJEA is a jurisdictional statute that seeks procedurally to implement the PKPA, which is the federal full faith and credit law for child custody determinations.

The PKPA provides for the home state to have exclusive jurisdiction and for “continuing jurisdiction” by a court that made a child custody determination consistent with its provisions.4  The UCCJEA provides for exclusive jurisdiction by the home state and exclusive “continuing jurisdiction” by the court that made an initial child custody determination consistent with the UCCJEA.5

• 1La. R.S. 13:1801, et seq.
• 228 U.S.C. § 1738A.
• 3See La. R.S. 13:1806.
• 428 U.S.C. § 1738A(c)(2)(E). Only a prior action in an emergency jurisdiction state, which was otherwise consistent with the PKPA, would prime the home state. The PKPA definition of emergency jurisdiction supersedes any state law definition of emergency jurisdiction. Jones v. Jones, 456 So. 2d 1109, 1112 (Ala. Civ. App. 1984).
• 5La. R.S. 13:1813–1814.

Personal jurisdiction is not required for the adjudication of child custody.1  The concept of personal jurisdiction is irrelevant to custody disputes. A court may decide custody without personal jurisdiction over a defendant. UCCJEA child custody jurisdiction is in the nature of subject matter jurisdiction, which can’t be waived. The lack of UCCJEA subject matter jurisdiction can’t be waived by an appearance.

• 1La. R.S. 13:1813(C). Note that claims other than divorce and custody may also require “minimum contacts” with Louisiana in order for Louisiana courts to have personal jurisdiction. Atkins v. Atkins, 588 So. 2d 407 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1991).

The UCCJEA does not prescribe a special notice procedure for interstate custody disputes. Rather, it incorporates the Louisiana law on notice and service of process for non-residents or the law of the state where the non-resident lives.1  As a result, non-residents need to be notified and served under Louisiana’s Long-Arm Statute,2  which generally involves service by certified mail and 30 days’ notice before a hearing on a custody motion or rule except for family violence protective order actions under La. R.S. 46:2131, et seq.

• 1La. R.S. 13:1808.
• 2La. R.S. 13:3204–3205.

La. R.S. 13:1813(A) provides the exclusive jurisdictional basis for a Louisiana court to make an initial child custody determination. Under La. R.S. 13:1813(A)(1), the child’s home state will have exclusive jurisdiction to make an initial child custody determination. Thus, the home state trumps all other states, even if the custody suit in the other state was filed first.

The home state is the state in which the child lived with a parent or a “person acting as a parent” for at least 6 consecutive months prior to the commencement of a child custody proceeding. Both the UCCJEA and Louisiana law define commencement as the filing of the first pleading in a proceeding.1  A “temporary absence” of the child, parent, or person acting as a parent when they are away from the home state does not take away from the computation of this 6 consecutive month period.2  In case of a child under 6 months old, home state means the state in which the child lived from birth with a parent or person acting as a parent.3  The Louisiana UCCJEA further extends this “temporary absence” window when the parent or person acting as a parent who has had to evacuate with the child due to a disaster and is unable to return to Louisiana for an extended period. Louisiana would still be considered the home state if they had lived in Louisiana for at least 12 consecutive months prior to the initial custody proceeding.4

The first step in any interstate custody dispute is to determine the home state, if any. Most cases should have a home state, and exclusive jurisdiction will rest with the home state. The home state will have initial jurisdiction, which will exist even if a custody determination has been made in another state.

The determination of home state status should be relatively easy. Each litigant’s first pleading should contain an affidavit that discloses facts relevant to the determination of UCCJEA jurisdiction. Possible issues may arise for cases that involve a child under 6 months old or a child’s temporary absences from a state. If a child was born in state A, lived there for 2 months with a parent, and then relocated to state B for 3 months, state A would be the home state because state A is the only state where the child lived continuously from birth.

While the UCCJEA does not define “temporary absence,” it can be argued that a temporary absence that is greater than 6 months (unless there is a disaster exception or a clearly defined reason for being away from the home state such as vacation, school, etc.) would divest Louisiana from being considered the home state. Clearly, the UCCJEA permits home state jurisdiction when the “temporary absence” is within the 6-month window of the custody proceeding. Other states’ courts have looked at whether a state was the home state at any time within the prior 6 months. Thus, for example, if the custody suit was filed on July 1, the issue would be whether the state was the “home state” on the prior January 1, when the temporary absence commenced.

• 1La. R.S. 13:1802(5).
• 2La. RS. 13:1813.
• 3La. R.S. 13:1802(7).
• 4Id.

If there is no home state or if the home state has declined jurisdiction under La. R.S. 13:1819 or 1820, you must determine which state had “significant connections” jurisdiction under La. R.S. 13:1813(A)(2). “Significant connections” jurisdiction will not provide a court with initial jurisdiction under the UCCJEA if there is a home state.

For “significant connections” jurisdiction to exist, (1) the child and the child’s parents or the child and at least one parent or person acting as a parent must have a significant connection with the state other than mere physical presence and (2) substantial evidence must be available in the state on the child’s care, protection, training, and personal relationships. The child’s physical presence is not required for significant connections jurisdiction. The focus is on which state has substantial evidence as to the child’s care, protection, training, and relationships. If both states have “significant connections” jurisdiction, UCCJEA jurisdiction will lie with the first court in which a custody suit was filed.

If all courts having jurisdiction under the UCCJEA have declined jurisdiction because Louisiana is the more appropriate forum, Louisiana could have UCCJEA jurisdiction under La. R.S. 13:1803(A)(3).

The final jurisdictional basis is “default” or “vacuum” jurisdiction under La. R.S. 13:1813(A)(4). It exists when no court of any other state would have jurisdiction under the other bases for UCCJEA, i.e., home state, significant connections, or declination in favor of Louisiana.

Temporary emergency jurisdiction exists “if the child is present in this state and the child has been abandoned or it is necessary in an emergency to protect the child because the child, or a sibling or parent of the child, is subjected to or threatened with mistreatment or abuse.”1  Because the statute grants emergency jurisdiction in cases of abuse, it clarifies a Louisiana court’s authority to issue temporary orders to protect family violence victims who may have fled to Louisiana.

If a prior custody order exists, the judge must confer with the other state’s judge.2  Then, the court with temporary emergency jurisdiction must specify a reasonable time limit for the plaintiff to obtain an order from the state with proper La. R.S. 13:1813–1815 jurisdiction. The temporary emergency order will remain in effect until an order is obtained from the other state or the time limit expires.3

There is a mandatory duty for a Louisiana court to communicate with the other state’s judge if (1) the Louisiana court has been asked to make a custody determination under emergency jurisdiction and it is informed that a child custody proceeding or order exists in a state having La. R.S. 13:1813–1815 jurisdiction; or (2) if the Louisiana court has La. R.S. 13:1813–1815 jurisdiction and it is informed that another state has exercised emergency jurisdiction. The purpose of the communication is to resolve the jurisdiction, protect the safety of the parties and child, and determine the duration of the temporary custody order.4

• 1 La. R.S. 13:1816(A).
• 2La. R.S. 13:1816(D).
• 3See La. R.S. 13:1816(C).
• 4See La. R.S. 13:1816(D).

How does the court resolve jurisdiction when there is a proceeding in another state? Except for temporary emergency jurisdiction cases under La. R.S. 13:1816, the Louisiana court must examine the court documents and the parties’ La. R.S. 13:1821 affidavits to determine UCCJEA subject matter jurisdiction before hearing a custody case.1  This creates an independent, affirmative duty for the court to review and determine jurisdiction. If the Louisiana court finds that the other state’s court had UCCJEA jurisdiction, the Louisiana court must stay the Louisiana proceedings and communicate with the other state’s court.2  If the other state with UCCJEA jurisdiction does not determine that Louisiana is the more appropriate forum, the Louisiana court must dismiss the Louisiana proceeding.3

• 1La. R.S. 13:1818.
• 2Id.
• 3Id.

Communications with another state’s court are mandatory only when (1) there are simultaneous custody proceedings; (2) a Louisiana court exercising temporary emergency jurisdiction under La. R.S. 13:1816 learns that a proceeding exists in another state; or (3) a Louisiana court with non-emergency UCCJEA jurisdiction learns that another state has assumed temporary emergency jurisdiction. A Louisiana court may communicate with another state on other jurisdictional matters, but it is not required to do so. As a practical matter, without communicating with the other court, it would be difficult for a court to evaluate the seventh and eighth factors of the analysis required by La. R.S. 13:1819 for evaluating a motion to decline jurisdiction on inconvenient forum grounds.

Under La. R.S. 13:1819, a Louisiana court may decline its UCCJEA jurisdiction at any time if it determines that it is an inconvenient forum and that another state is a more appropriate forum.1  A motion to decline may be raised at any time by any party, by the court on its own motion, or at the request of another court.2  Only the court with UCCJEA jurisdiction may decide if it is an inconvenient forum.3

The first inquiry under La. R.S. 13:1819 is whether it is appropriate for the court of another state to exercise jurisdiction.4  The court must allow the parties to submit “information” on this issue and shall consider 8 specific statutory factors.5  The use of “information” instead of “evidence” suggests that this issue may be decided on briefs, affidavits, and other information. There are few appellate opinions on this issue. Like any other factor analysis, it is fact intensive. Be prepared to plea with specificity the facts supporting each factor in your favor and provide evidentiary support when available.

Often, factors #1 and #2, domestic violence and the length of time that the child has resided outside of Louisiana, will be the major factors in the La. R.S. 13:1819 analysis. A Louisiana court with UCCJEA jurisdiction may decline in favor of the victim’s refuge state. The leading case on the domestic violence factor for an inconvenient forum analysis is Stoneman v. Drollinger.6

The UCCJEA does not require a Louisiana court with proper UCCJEA jurisdiction to communicate with the court of another state before it decides to decline jurisdiction to that court as a more appropriate forum.7  However, if the Louisiana court communicates with the other state’s court on a substantive matter, it must make a record of the communication.8  Furthermore, the parties must be informed of the communication and granted access to the record of the communication.9  Finally, if the parties are not able to participate in the inter-court communications, they must be given the opportunity to present facts and legal arguments before a decision on jurisdiction is made.10

Under La. R.S. 13:1820, a Louisiana court must decline jurisdiction (except in limited circumstances) if the person seeking to invoke its jurisdiction has engaged in “unjustifiable conduct.” Unjustifiable conduct may include wrongful removal, retention, or concealment of the child. How does La. R.S. 13:1820 apply to a domestic violence victim who seeks refuge in Louisiana, possibly in violation of a custody decree? La. R.S 13:1820 says that mandatory declination of jurisdiction does not apply where domestic violence victim invoked temporary jurisdiction pursuant to La. R.S. 13:1816. In addition, the comments to § 208 of the model UCCJEA state that a domestic violence victim’s flight to another state in violation of a custody decree should not result in that state’s automatic dismissal of the victim’s custody suit. Rather, an inquiry should be made into whether the flight was justified under the circumstances.

• 1La. R.S. 13:1819(A).
• 2Id.
• 3Id.
• 4La. R.S. 13:1819(B).
• 5Id.
• 664 P.3d 997 (Mont. 2003).
• 7For additional discussion, see Section 4.10.11.
• 8La. R.S. 13:1810.
• 9Id.
• 10Id.

La. R.S. 13:1814 provides for exclusive continuing jurisdiction for the court that made an initial custody determination consistent with the jurisdictional rules of La. R.S. 13:1813–1815. This is a bright line test that should make it easy for courts to decide if continuing jurisdiction still exists.

If Louisiana had initial jurisdiction, its exclusive continuing jurisdiction lasts until a Louisiana court decides that neither the child nor the parent(s) or person(s) acting as parent(s) have a significant connection with Louisiana or the foreign state determines that the child, parent(s), and person(s) acting as parent(s) no longer reside in Louisiana. Similarly, Louisiana can’t assume jurisdiction if another state had initial jurisdiction consistent with La. R.S. 13:1813–1815 unless the other state declines jurisdiction or the Louisiana court finds that the child, parent(s), and person(s) acting as parent(s) no longer reside in the state that had exclusive continuing jurisdiction under the UCCJEA.

La. R.S. 13:1815 significantly restricts when a court may modify a custody determination made by another state. It prohibits Louisiana from assuming jurisdiction to modify merely because Louisiana is the home state at the time of the motion to modify is filed.

La. R.S. 13:1815 provides that, except as authorized in La. R.S. 13:1816 (temporary emergency jurisdiction), a Louisiana court may not modify a custody determination made by another state unless a Louisiana court has home state or significant connections jurisdiction and either (1) the court of the other state determines that it no longer has exclusive, continuing jurisdiction or that a Louisiana court would be a more convenient forum; or (2) a Louisiana court or the other state’s court determines that the child, parent(s), and person(s) acting as parent(s) no longer reside in the other state.

The UCCJEA does not require a foreign decree to be registered in order to be enforced. La. R.S. 13:1827 states that the other state’s decree may be registered in a Louisiana court by sending the Louisiana court a “letter or other document requesting registration” along with two copies (one must be certified) of the foreign judgment and other information. On receipt of the documents, the Louisiana court is supposed to file the foreign judgment and serve notice on the opposing party advising that party that the foreign judgment is immediately enforceable as a Louisiana judgment and that the party has 20 days to request a hearing to contest the validity of the registered foreign judgment.

The grounds to contest the foreign judgment are (1) lack of UCCJEA jurisdiction; (2) vacatur, stay, or modification of the foreign judgment by a court with UCCJEA jurisdiction; and (3) lack of notice of the foreign court proceeding in accordance with the standards of La. R.S. 13:1808. No other defenses are allowed. La. R.S. 13:1828 further provides that a Louisiana court may grant any relief available under Louisiana law to enforce a registered child custody determination made by a court of another state.

La. R.S. 13:1827 speaks of simply filing a “letter or other document” to register and confirm a foreign custody judgment or order. However, La. R.S. 13:1830 requires a verified petition for “expedited” enforcement of a foreign custody judgment or order when a party seeks immediate physical custody pursuant to the foreign custody decree. Interestingly, La. R.S. 13:1830(C) states that the hearing shall be heard on the next judicial day after service of the order directing the respondent to appear at a hearing.

La. R.S. 13:1835 mandates that a Louisiana court accord full faith and credit or enforce another state’s custody order where jurisdiction was exercised in “substantial conformity” or is consistent with the UCCJEA. La. R.S. 13:1805 allows for international application of the UCCJEA and treats the foreign country as if it were a state of the USA.1

Appeals from a final order in a proceeding to enforce a foreign custody determination must be expedited, and the Louisiana trial court is prohibited from staying an order enforcing the child custody determination pending appeal. Only the appellate court may issue a stay.2  Also, the U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that the PKPA (and thus, the UCCJEA) do not create an implied cause of action in federal court.3  Rather, the federal full faith and credit clause must be enforced in the state courts.

• 1See Guzman v. Sartin, 2009-1677 (La. App. 1 Cir. 12/23/09), 31 So. 3d 426.
• 2See La. R.S. 13:1836.
• 3See Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174 (1988).

La. R.S. 13:1834 strengthens and expands the prevailing party’s claims for attorney fees and other expenses in an UCCJEA enforcement proceeding. La. R.S. 13:1834 mandates the award of attorney fees unless the party from whom fees are sought establishes that the award would be “clearly inappropriate.” The comments to the model UCCJEA state that attorney fees may be inappropriate if an award would cause a parent and child to seek public assistance. The same rule for attorney fees and costs applies under La. R.S. 13:1820 for cases that are dismissed or stayed because a court declined jurisdiction because of a party’s unjustifiable conduct, e.g., removing the child to Louisiana to avoid the home state’s jurisdiction.
     
A wonderful resource for interstate custody questions is the Legal Resource Center on Violence Against Women, which provides technical assistance and training on interstate custody issues, including the UCCJEA.1

• 1Legal Resource Ctr. on Violence Against Women.

The Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA)1  gives tribes a substantial role in matters concerning custody of Indian children. State courts must defer to tribal jurisdiction in child custody proceedings involving an Indian child for matters such as foster placement, termination of parental rights, and adoption. While the ICWA is not triggered for custody and divorce proceedings, it is nevertheless wise to be cautious if a matter is pending in tribal court of the child is an “Indian Child” as defined by the Act.

• 125 U.S.C. §§ 1901–1963.

The International Parental Kidnapping Act (IPKA) makes it a crime to remove a child from the United States or retain a child under the age of 16 years (who has been in the United States) outside the United States with intent to obstruct the lawful exercise of parental rights.1  Under the laws of the United States and many foreign countries, if there is no custody decree prior to abduction, both parents may be considered to have equal legal custody of their child. Even though both parents may have custody of a child, it still may be a crime for one parent to remove the child from the United States against the other parent’s wishes. It may be necessary to include express language in the custody degree that prohibits a child from traveling abroad without permission of the other parent or that of the court.2

• 118 U.S.C. § 1204, et seq.
• 2For more information, see Bureau of Consular Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of State, Prevention Tips,Travel.State.Gov.

The Uniform International Child Abduction Prevention Act provides for measures and orders for the prevention of child abduction.1

• 1La. R.S. 13:1851, et seq.; see Mohsen v. Mohsen, 2008-1703 (La. App. 1 Cir. 12/23/08), 5 So. 3d 218.

The Hague Convention is a civil procedure for parents seeking the return of or access to their children. As a civil law mechanism, the parents, not the governments, are parties to the legal action. The countries that are parties to the Convention have agreed that a child who is habitually resident in one party country and who has been removed to or retained in another party country in violation of the left-behind parent’s custodial rights shall be promptly returned to the country of habitual residence. The Convention can also help parents exercise visitation rights abroad.

There is a treaty obligation to return an abducted child below the age of 16 if application is made within 1 year from the date of the wrongful removal or retention, unless one of the exceptions to return apply. If the application for return is made after 1 year, the court may use its discretion to decide that the child has become resettled in the new country and refuse to order return of the child. In any case, a court may refuse to order a child returned in several circumstances:

• There is a grave risk that the child would be exposed to physical or psychological harm or otherwise placed in an intolerable situation in his or her country of habitual residence.
• If the child objects to being returned and has reached an age and degree of maturity at which the court can take account of the child’s views. The treaty does not establish at what age children reach this level of maturity; that age and the degree of weight given to children’s views varies from country to country.
• If the return would violate the fundamental principles of human rights and freedoms of the country where the child is being held.

Legal services attorneys may handle Hague Convention cases for a financially eligible person even if that person is not a U.S. citizen or lawful alien. Attorney fees may be recoverable under Article 26 of the Convention1  or the UCCJEA. The United States Central Authority for the Hague Convention will support any attorney handling a convention case with technical assistance and attorney mentoring.

• 122 U.S.C. § 9007.

The Uniform Enforcement of Domestic Violence Protective Orders Act seeks to make interstate enforcement of protective orders more uniform. While many states have enacted it, Louisiana has not.