Domestic violence survivors often face financial challenges when separating from abusive partners that make spousal support especially important. Years of abuse cause many victims to have serious health problems that adversely impact their ability to support themselves. The following sections discuss special issues that arise when a domestic violence survivor claims spousal support.1

• 1For discussion of the general principles surrounding interim and final spousal support, see Section 7 of the chapter on family law.

Proof of freedom from fault is not required for interim spousal support. However, to get final spousal support, a spouse must show that she was free from fault in the dissolution of the marriage and that she lacks means of support.1  In domestic violence cases, there is now a legal presumption that the abused spouse is entitled to final support.2  But, this presumption can be overcome.

A petitioner who is awarded a fault-based divorce pursuant to La. C.C. art. 103(4) or (5) or who is determined by the court to have been a victim of domestic abuse during the marriage in an Article 102 proceeding is presumed to be entitled to final periodic spousal support.3  This shifts the burden to the abusive party to overcome the presumption through evidence of the petitioner’s need, that abusive party’s ability to pay, and the petitioner’s pre-filing fault.4  Further, when support is awarded after a judgment of divorce based on domestic abuse, “the sum awarded may exceed one-third of the obligor’s net income and may be awarded as a lump sum.”5  These benefits are not available for divorces based on other grounds.

Sometimes an abusive former partner seeks to benefit from the collateral consequences of the abuse by characterizing the problems caused by the abuse, such as mental health problems or substance dependence, as fault that would relieve the abusive party of the obligation of final support. Fault that bars spousal support must be serious and an independent contributory or proximate cause of the breakup.6

• 1La. C.C. art. 111.
• 2La. C.C. art. 112(C).
• 3Id.
• 4Id. 2018 cmt. But see Morgan v. Morgan, 2022-0472, p. 13 (La. App. 4 Cir. 12/13/22), 353 So. 3d 1026, 1034 (finding that post-filing adultery precluded domestic violence victim from obtaining final support).
• 5La. C.C. art. 112(D)
• 6Matthews v. Matthews, 15–499, p. 6 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/23/15), 184 So. 3d 173, 177.

Abandonment. Abandonment without lawful cause is a common ground for finding “fault” that bars final spousal support. It is not uncommon for an abusive former partner to allege abandonment when the abused spouse leaves because of the violence. A finding of domestic violence precludes a finding that the victim abandoned her spouse.1  In order to defend against fault, the victim must prove the abuse if she has not already done so. Even threats of violence constitute lawful cause for abandonment.2

Adultery. Despite the presumption in favor of final periodic support, a domestic violence victim who engages in either pre- or post-filing adultery may be considered at fault and barred from final support.3

Self-defense or Responsive Violence. If the victim of abuse has committed violence against the abusive partner that is a “reasonable and justifiable response” to the abuse, she is not “at fault” in the breakup of the marriage.4  According to the 2018 Revision Comments to Article 112, “[i]n the domestic violence context in particular, the court should consider the potentially responsive nature of a victim’s actions.” Arguably, “responsive” violence is broader than self-defense and could include acts of resistance in an abusive relationship that are not necessarily or neatly framed as self-defense.

Reconciliation. Reconciliation often occurs in violent relationships prior to the final separation. Reconciliation that follows “fault” nullifies the prior fault.5  Thus, the critical question is the alleged misconduct that occurred between the last reconciliation and the filing of the divorce action. But in some cases, reconciliation can be challenged as nonmutual. For instance, if a perpetrator moves back into a shared home without the victim’s consent, or the victim returns to a shared home for fear of her safety, her intent to reconcile may be at issue. The motives and intent of the parties will determine reconciliation.6  In general, however, if domestic violence, financial abuse, fear, or coercion contributed to the circumstances that the abuser claims constitute reconciliation, the requisite intent and forgiveness may be lacking, and application of the nullification principle is both wrong and inequitable.

Mental health and substance dependence. Some survivors suffer from mental health challenges or substance dependence because of the trauma and abuse they have experienced.7  “Misconduct” caused by mental illness is excused and will not bar final support.8  The mental illness must precede the misconduct. In these cases, expert medical testimony on the mental illness and the causal relationship to the misconduct is highly recommended, but not required.9  Alcohol and substance dependence can be fault-based causes for divorce, but the consumption must be to such an extent that it substantially interferes with the spouse’s marital duties or inflicts great mental anguish upon the other spouse.”10  One study found that 67% of abusive partners frequently abuse alcohol.11  The abusive partner’s intemperance may preclude a finding of fault against the victim.12  A course of conduct such as drinking, when approved and consented to by both spouses, cannot constitute mutual fault.13

• 1Thomas v. Thomas, 2017-0760, p. 9 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2/21/18), 238 So. 3d 515, 522.
• 2Caldwell v. Caldwell, 95-CA-963 (La. App. 5 Cir. 3/13/96), 672 So. 2d 944, 947.
• 3Morgan v. Morgan, 2022-0472, p. 13 (La. App. 4 Cir. 12/13/22), 353 So. 3d 1026, 1034.
• 4See Smith v. Smith, 08-575, p. 16 (La. App. 5 Cir. 1/12/10), 31 So. 3d 453, 464 (wife arrested for simple battery after throwing scalding water on her husband was not at fault in the break-up of the marriage where evidence showed a history of abuse and that she acted in self-defense).
• 5La. C.C. art. 104; see Doane v. Benenate, 95-CA-0953, p. 3 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2/15/96), 671 So. 2d 523, 525; see also Noto v. Noto, 09-1100, p. 7 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/11/10), 41 So. 3d 1175, 1180.
• 6Woods v. Woods, 27199-CA, p. 2 (La. App. 2 Cir. 8/23/95); 660 So. 2d 134, 136; see also Rivette v. Rivette, 2004-1630, p. 4 (La. App. 3 Cir. 4/6/05), 899 So. 2d 873, 875 (citing Woods).
• 7Richard Irons & Jennifer Schneider, When is Domestic Violence a Hidden Face of Addiction, 29 J. Psychoactive Drugs 337 (1997) (reporting that battered women comprise 64% of female patients admitted to inpatient psychiatric service).
• 8Doane, 95-CA-0953, p. 3, 671 So. 2d at 525; Eppling v. Eppling, 537 So. 2d 814, 818 (La. App. 5 Cir. 1989).
• 9See Scarengos v. Scarengos, 606 So. 2d 9, 10 (La. App. 5 Cir. 1992). But see Dolese v. Dolese, 517 So. 2d 1279, 1280 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1987).
• 10Matthews v. Matthews, 15-499, p. 7 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/23/15), 184 So. 3d 173, 178.
• 11Irons & Schneider, supra.
• 12"Intemperance" is defined by Oxford Languages as “excessive indulgence, especially in alcohol.” Intemperate, Concise Oxford English Dictionary (luxury ed. 2011).
• 13Jenkins v. Jenkins, 38,873-CA (La. App. 2 Cir. 8/22/04), 882 So. 2d 705; 712-13; Matthews, 15-499, 184 So. 3d at 179.