4.1.6 Cause of Action under VAWA

4.1.6 Cause of Action under VAWA aetrahan Tue, 01/24/2023 - 10:34

In United States v. Morrison, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the portion of VAWA providing a private cause of action for survivors of crimes of violence motivated by gender is unconstitutional.1  Whether this holding extends to the separate housing provisions of VAWA is an open question that has not been settled in the Fifth Circuit.2

A number of district courts across the country have ruled that Morrison applies to the housing provisions of VAWA, and therefore there is no private cause of action against a housing provider that violates VAWA.3  However, there is an argument to be made that there may be a cause of action under § 1983 against a housing provider for violation of VAWA, but the question is yet unsettled.4  In the alternative, a violation of VAWA by a housing provider may give rise to a cause of action under the Fair Housing Act for discrimination on the basis of sex.5

Of course, a housing provider’s violation of VAWA may violate a tenant’s lease and give rise to state-law cause of action for breach of contract. Housing Choice Voucher Program and Project-Based Voucher Program leases are subject to HUD Tenancy Addendums that include VAWA provisions. Many HUD subsidy programs require a VAWA addendum to the lease agreement. Because the validity of the federal claims under VAWA is uncertain, be sure to include these claims in addition to any federal claims.

  • 1529 U.S. 598 (2000).
  • 2McCoy v. Hous. Auth. of New Orleans, No. 15-398, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 118745, at *51, 2016 WL 4592162, at *15 (E.D. La. Sep. 2, 2016) (stating that the Fifth Circuit has not yet decided the issue and declining to rule on it), aff’d, 714 F. App’x 322 (5th Cir. 2017).
  • 3Bezi v. Camacho, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 162852, at *61–62, 2012 WL 5519386, at *19 (C.D. Cal. Sep. 28, 2012); Hobby v. Hous. Auth. of New Haven, No. 3:11cv1962, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 126027, at *5–6, 2012 WL 3727267, at *2 (D. Conn. Jan. 9, 2012); Louis v. N.Y.C. Hous. Auth., 152 F. Supp. 3d 143, 157 n.12 (S.D.N.Y. 2016); Doe v. YMCA of Ne. NY, No. 1:19-CV-456, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24223, at *19, 2020 WL 705264, at *6 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 12, 2020).
  • 4Meister v. Kan. City, No. 09-2433-EFM, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19166, at *14, 2011 WL 765887, at *4 (D. Kan. Feb. 25, 2011) (distinguishing the language in the VAWA housing provisions from language analyzed in Banks v. Dallas Housing Authority, 271 F. 3d 605, 611 (5th Cir. 2001), in which no § 1983 cause of action was found and finding that the VAWA language came closer to satisfying the § 1983 test than the statutory provision at issue in Banks, but still declining to rule on the issue).
  • 5Dickinson v. Zanesville Metro. Hous. Auth., 975 F. Supp. 2d 863, 872 (S.D. Ohio 2013) (“[D]ereliction of its obligations under the Violence Against Women Act ("VAWA”) . . . could give rise to an inference that [Defendant Housing Authority] acted with intent to discriminate on the basis of gender.”).