In Younger v. Harris, the Supreme Court held that federal courts must abstain from interference with pending state court criminal proceedings.1  The Fifth Circuit has long held that federal courts should abstain under Younger only in very limited, narrow circumstances.2  Ten years after Younger, the Supreme Court ruled that the Younger abstention applies in civil proceedings if there is an ongoing state judicial proceeding, the proceedings implicates important state interests, and there is an adequate opportunity in the state proceedings to raise constitutional challenges; this is known as the Middlesex test.3

In 2013 the Supreme Court clarified that “even in the presence of parallel state proceedings, abstention from the exercise of federal jurisdiction is the ‘exception, not the rule.’”4  Prior to conducting the Middlesex test, the federal court must first determine if the proceeding falls into one of the “exceptional circumstances” that “justif[ies] a federal court’s refusal to decide a case in deference to the States.”5  These circumstances include ongoing state criminal prosecutions, certain civil enforcement proceedings, and pending “civil proceedings involving certain orders . . . uniquely in furtherance of the state courts’ ability to perform their judicial functions.”6  This test arguably restricts the ability of federal courts to abstain in eviction cases.7  As a practical matter, a federal suit seeking to enjoin an eviction must be filed before the eviction action is filed to avoid Younger abstention issues.

• 1401 U.S. 37, 53 (1971).
• 2Morial v. Judiciary Comm’n of La., 565 F.2d 295, 299 (5th Cir. 1977) (“The Younger principles simply are not . . . a broad, discretionary, device for the evasion of the responsibility of federal courts to protect federal rights from invasion by state officials.”).
• 3Middlesex Cty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982).
• 4Sprint Commc’ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 81–82 (2013) (quoting Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 236 (1984)).
• 5Id. at 78 (quoting New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 368 (1989)).
• 6Id.
• 7For examples of housing cases (non-FHA) where tenants have defeated Younger abstention, see Kemp v. Chi. Hous. Auth., No. 10 C 3347, 2010 WL 2927417 (N.D. Ill. 2010) (termination of public housing assistance); Ayers v. Phila. Hous. Auth., 908 F.2d 1184, 1195 n. 21 (3d Cir. 1990) (due process); McNeill v. N.Y.C. Hous. Auth., 719 F. Supp. 233, 255 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (procedures for terminating rent subsidy).

The Anti-Injunction Act bars federal courts from enjoining an already filed state court action except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments.1  The courts are divided over whether the Anti-Injunction Act applies to Fair Housing Act claims.2  Although the Anti-Injunction Act would not apply if the defendant were a “state actor” subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Younger abstention may still bar the federal injunction.3

• 128 U.S.C. § 2283.
• 2Compare Casa Marie, Inc. v. Superior Ct. of P.R., 988 F. 2d 252 (1st Cir. 1993) with Oxford House, Inc. v. City of Albany, 819 F. Supp. 1168 (N.D.N.Y. 1993).
• 3Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine deprives a federal court of jurisdiction to review state court judgments in cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by a state court judgment rendered before the federal suit began.1  Rooker-Feldman does not apply to Fair Housing Act claims based on conduct that predates the state court judgment.2  However, some courts, including the Fifth Circuit, may apply Rooker-Feldman more broadly to bar actions that require reviewing the validity of a state court eviction judgment.3

• 1The doctrine is enunciated in two U.S. Supreme Court cases. See Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983).
• 2Poindexter v. Allegheny Cnty. Hous. Auth., 329 F. App’x 347 (3d Cir. 2009); Long v. Shore Bank Dev. Corp., 182 F.3d 548 (7th Cir. 1999).
• 3See, e.g., Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Guy, 682 F.3d 381, 390-91 (5th Cir. 2012); Babalola v. B.Y. Equities, Inc., 63 F. App’x 534 (2d Cir. 2003); Chambers v. Habitat Co., 215 F.3d 1329 (7th Cir. 2000).