The standard for issuance of a final protective order under La. R.S. 46:2136 is that it is necessary “to bring about a cessation of abuse of a party, any minor children, or any person alleged to be incompetent” or “the threat or danger thereof.”1 Louisiana courts of appeal apply an abuse-of-discretion standard when reviewing the issuance or denial of protective orders.2
Additionally, La. R.S. 46:2136(A) makes clear that a petitioner need not wait until actual harm has happened before becoming eligible for protection. A protective order can be issued to prevent the threat, danger, or possibility of abuse.3 For example, in Newton v. Berry, the Second Circuit held that a stepfather’s act of disrobing, getting into bed with minor child, and tickling the child’s stomach constituted “grooming” behavior that met the definition of “domestic abuse,” whether or not those acts rose to the level of a crime.4 The Newton court concluded that there was “nothing in the law [that] would require the courts to ignore such behavior and leave a child at the mercy of the perpetrator until more harm is done.”5 In Wise v. Wise, the Fifth Circuit affirmed a protective order in favor of a petitioner who testified about past abuse and the defendant’s threat to retaliate against her upon release from a six-month incarceration that resulted from the defendant’s failure to pay child support.6
- 1La. R.S. 46:2136. Note, however, that Louisiana Protective Order Registry Form 3, a protective order pursuant to La. R.S. 46:2131, includes boilerplate findings of immediate and present danger of abuse and good and reasonable grounds to fear for safety as the reasons for issuing the protective order.
- 2Watson v. Banguel, 2022-01678 (La. 1/25/23), 353 So. 3d 717, 718 n. 1.
- 3La. R.S. 46:2136.
- 4Newton v. Berry, 44,383-JAC (La. App. 2 Cir. 5/20/09), 15 So. 3d 262, 276. In Newton, the court did conclude, however, that the behavior described constituted an offense under the criminal code. Id.
- 5Id. at 267.
- 6Wise v. Wise, 02-574 (La. App. 5 Cir. 11/13/02), 833 So. 2d 393.