In Stogner v. Stogner,1 the Louisiana Supreme Court issued a decision on modification of child support judgments. Stogner made two important holdings. The first was that the appellate court had erred in requiring a “substantial change” in circumstances instead of a simple change as provided in the prior Civil Code Article 142 and La. R.S. 9:311. The law was changed in 2001 to require “a material change,” thus overruling Stogner in this regard.
The second Stogner holding was that even a stipulated or consent judgment regarding child support must be reviewed by the court for the adequacy of the stipulated amount in light of the child support guidelines. If a stipulated amount differs from the guidelines, the court must give specific oral or written reasons for deviating from the guidelines. This holding is still good law. Thus, to modify a prior judgment of child support, allege a “material change” in circumstances for your client from the previous award date to the new filing. If a consent judgment is reached, ensure that the child support amount is consistent with the child support guidelines and satisfies Stogner.
What is a “material change” in circumstances of the parties? The statute says that the change must have occurred between the date of the prior award and the time of filing the motion to modify.2 Otherwise, the statute and jurisprudence do not define “material change” for private child support actions. Parties typically argue a change in the parties’ income, increased expenses, or a change in time spent with the child. If the state brought the child support action, a material change exists when strict application of the child support guidelines will result in a 25% change in the child support award.3 It is important that the record for the original award be supported by each party’s Obligation Worksheet. Without such documentation, it is difficult to determine whether a material change has occurred since the prior award.
Parties can temporarily modify child support extrajudicially by agreement. The agreement must meet the requirements of a contract, and the evidence must establish that the parties have agreed to waive or modify court-ordered payments.4 Also, the agreement must foster continued support of the child and not interrupt the child’s maintenance or otherwise work to the child’s detriment.5
La. R.S. 9:315.1(D) states that the court may require the parties to provide the proof that is otherwise mandated by R.S. 9:315.2(A), which provides that “the parties shall provide to the court a verified income statement. . . .” The author’s position is that to comply with Stogner, the mandatory review expected of the court can only be meaningful if the consent judgment is submitted in compliance with La. R.S. 9:315.2(A), i.e., together with supporting documentation of the parties’ income and not just a worksheet. Otherwise, the absurd result would follow that the parties could collude and submit any amount, whether real or self-serving, to the court on a worksheet and receive court approval.